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Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to bring substantial benefits to
medicine. In addition to pushing the frontiers of what is humanly
possible, like predicting kidney failure or sepsis before any human
can notice, it can democratize expertise beyond the circle of highly
specialized practitioners, like letting generalists diagnose diabetic
degeneration of the retina. But AI doesn’t always work, and it
doesn’t always work for everyone, and it doesn’t always work in
every context. AI is likely to behave differently in well-resourced
hospitals where it is developed than in poorly resourced frontline
health environments where it might well make the biggest
difference for patient care. To make the situation even more
complicated, AI is unlikely to go through the centralized review
and validation process that other medical technologies undergo,
like drugs and most medical devices. Even if it did go through
those centralized processes, ensuring high-quality performance
across a wide variety of settings, including poorly resourced
settings, is especially challenging for such centralized
mechanisms. What are policymakers to do? This short Essay
argues that the diffusion of medical AI, with its many potential
benefits, will require policy support for a process of distributed
governance, where quality evaluation and oversight take place in
the settings of application—but with policy assistance in
developing capacities and making that oversight more
straightforward to undertake. Getting governance right will not
be easy (it never is), but ignoring the issue is likely to leave benefits
on the table and patients at risk.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. JD, Columbia Law
School, 2011. PhD (Biology), Columbia University, 2010. This work was
presented as part of the SMU SciTech Law Review’s 2022 Symposium on AI &
Medicine: The Emerging Legal and Ethical Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence in Medicine. I thank Mark Sendak for helpful discussions and
comments on an earlier draft; Ana Bracic, Karandeep Singh, and Yindalon
Aphinyanaphongs for helpful discussions; and Phoebe Roque for exemplary
research assistance.
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Why does medical AI require governance? Put plainly, quality,
safety, and efficacy are quite difficult to assess. Many health-care
technologies are credence goods, 1 requiring either blind faith in
quality (not a great plan) or some form of rigorous, systemic
evaluation (a better plan!) because one-off evaluations in the
moment don’t cut it. AI is very much a credence good. 2 It is novel;
it deals in probabilities rather than certainties; and it relies on
algorithms that are typically quite opaque, whether because of
secrecy, inherent technological limits, or merely their underlying
complexity.3 Like any technology involved in medical care,
whether AI works is hard knowledge to come by.
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And quality concerns are well founded; researchers have
demonstrated deep flaws with AI systems, including some in wide
use. Sometimes the systems just aren’t useful, and sometimes
they’re actively harmful. Health-care vendor Epic’s AI-powered
system to predict the risk of sepsis, distributed and used in
hospitals around the country, turns out to be a very poor predictor
of risk—perhaps because the algorithm used as a predictive
variable whether a physician had already ordered antibiotics, a
typical response to sepsis.4 COVID-19 prediction algorithms,
developed rapidly and heralded as a success story for quick AI
innovation in a global pandemic, turn out not to have performed
very well at all and to have made little difference. 5 A tool for
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1 Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, The Economics of
Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability,
Reputation, and Competition, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 526, 526 (2011).
2 W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV.
421, 432 (2017).
3 Id. at 432–37.
4 Andrew Wong et. al, External Validation of a Widely Implemented
Proprietary Sepsis Prediction Model in Hospitalized Patients 181 J. AM. MED.
INTER. MED. 1065 (2021); Casey Ross, Epic’s Sepsis Algorithm Is Going Off the
Rails in the Real World. The Use of These Variables May Explain Why, STAT
(Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/09/27/epic-sepsis-algorithmantibiotics-model/.
5 E.g., William Douglas Heaven, Hundreds of AI Tools Have Been Built to
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analyzing X-rays for pneumonia flopped when it was tested in
another hospital (it was relying on X-ray procedural clues rather
than actual patient image traits). 6 And a tool used by an insurer
to allocate care coordinators was shown to be strongly biased
against Black patients because of a careless proxy decision made
in development.7 AI has a lot of promise—but adopters are right
to be cautious, and real governance is required to make sure that
the systems being considered actually work in general, work where
they are used, and work for the patients and providers in that
particular setting.
II. THE LIMITS OF CENTRALIZED REGULATION
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The default turn for regulation of new medical technologies is to
FDA. The agency regulates drugs and medical devices, and
software—including AI software—is explicitly within the bounds
of regulated “medical devices”8 (or, at least, may be9), whether
embedded in other devices (Software in a Medical Device or SiMD)
or on its own (Software as a Medical Device, or SaMD).10 FDA
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Catch Covid. None of Them Helped, MIT TECH. REV. (July 30, 2021)
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/30/1030329/machine-learning-aifailed-covid-hospital-diagnosis-pandemic/; Jordana Cepelewicz, The Hard
Lessons of Modeling the Coronavirus Pandemic, QUANTA MAG. (Jan. 28, 2021)
https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-hard-lessons-of-modeling-thecoronavirus-pandemic-20210128/.
6 W. Nicholson Price II, Rachel E. Sachs & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, New
Innovation Models in Medical AI, XX WASH U. L. REV (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 44–45) (on file with author).
7 Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of
Populations, 366 SCI. 447 (2019); see also Jenna Wiens, W. Nicholson Price II &
Michael W. Sjoding, Diagnosing Bias in Data-Driven Algorithms for Healthcare,
26 NATURE MED. 22 (2020) (responding to Obermeyer et al.).
8 Barbara Evans & Frank A. Pasquale, Product Liability Suits for FDARegulated AI/ML Software, in THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION:
INNOVATION AND PROTECTION (I. Glenn Cohen, Timo Minssen, W. Nicholson
Price II, Christopher Robertson & Carmel Shachar eds., forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 2–3) (on file with author).
9 Id.; see also Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14
I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y, 61, 72–81 (2017).
10 See Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Key Definitions, International
Medical Device Regulators
Forum (“IMDFR”) (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-key-
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A. What does FDA see?

vie

regulates (or at least can regulate) software via the familiar Class
I-II-III risk-based categorization of medical devices, with scrutiny
titrated to risk.11 This process is meant to ensure that medical
devices are safe and effective before entering into commerce and
then into practice—but the process has severe limitations on how
well it can govern the quality of the broad sweep of AI products
developed and used today.
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The first problem is one of coverage: Many AI systems in
development or already in use have not gone through FDA review
of any kind, and many likely never will. As I have written with
Rachel Sachs and Rebecca Eisenberg, there is substantial user
innovation in the space of medical AI, where health systems,
hospitals, and insurers are developing AI systems for use within
their own walls.12 AI innovation is well within the capacity of
many well-resourced actors in this space, in a way that the
development of novel drugs or complex physical medical devices,
for instance, may not be.13 Academic medical centers have
developed in-house predictors for the likelihood of sepsis,14 hospital
systems have developed AI systems to model patient flow (and,
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definitions-140901.pdf; “Software as a Medical Device": Possible Framework for
Risk Categorization and Corresponding Considerations, IMDFR (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-140918-samdframework-risk-categorization-141013.pdf; Global Approach to Software as a
Medical Device, FDA (Dec. 6, 2017) https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/software-medical-device-samd/global-approach-software-medical-device
(adopting IMDFR’s regulatory framework).
11
Classify
Your
Medical
Device,
FDA
(Feb.
7,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/classify-yourmedical-device.
12 Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6.
13 Id. at 7–8. Notably, health systems have begun developing the capacity to
manufacture drugs, though so far their efforts are entirely focused on generic
manufacturing and not developing new products.
See, e.g., CIVICARX,
https://civicarx.org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2022) (describing a collaborative
generic drug manufacturing initiative undertaken by health systems).
14 See, e.g., Mark Sendak et al., Real-World Integration of a Sepsis Deep
Learning Technology into Routine Clinical Care: Implementation Study, 8 JMIR
MED. INFORM. 1 (2020) (discussing Duke Health’s Sepsis Watch program).
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accordingly, resource allocation), 15 and insurers have developed
models to allocate care coordinators to reduce costs. 16 These user
innovations are very unlikely to see any sort of formal FDA review
for multiple reasons, including FDA’s long-time exercise of
enforcement discretion over laboratory-developed tests,17 the
exclusion of many clinical decision support software products
(CDS) from the definition of medical devices under the 21st
Century Cures Act,18 and potentially other jurisdictional issues. 19
These systems are already being used. And they undoubtedly have
quality problems—indeed, multiple examples of quality failures
described above were in-house systems. But FDA does not review
them, at least not typically.20

er

On a broader scale, AI products are being embedded within
electronic health record (EHR) systems that are then distributed
See, e.g., Michael Thompson, New Ways to Improve Hospital Flow with
Predictive
Analytics
(March
2019),
https://www.slideshare.net/healthcatalyst1/new-ways-to-improve-hospital-flowwith-predictive-analytics (outlining Cedar-Sinai Medical Center’s AI tool that
aims to reduce capacity strain by predicting patient census).
16 Obermeyer, Powers, Vogeli & Mullainathan, supra note 7, at 447 (“Large
health systems and payers rely on this algorithm to target patients for ‘high-risk
care management’ programs. These programs seek to improve the care of
patients with complex health needs by providing additional resources, including
greater attention from trained providers, to help ensure that care is well
coordinated. Most health systems use these programs as the cornerstone of
population health management efforts, and they are widely considered effective
at improving outcomes and satisfaction while reducing costs.”).
17 Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 26; see also FDA, Draft
Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical
Laboratories, Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed
Tests (LDTs), at 5–7 (Oct. 2014); FDA, Discussion Paper on Laboratory
Developed Tests (LDTs), at 4–5 (Jan. 2017).
18 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. 114–255 §3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130–33
(2016), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360.
19 Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 22 (“The FDCA only applies to
products that are introduced, delivered, or received in interstate commerce, an
important limitation that may exclude many user innovations.”) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 331).
20 This is not to say that FDA is totally uninvolved; at least some developers
have had discussions with FDA officials about how to avoid FDA review by
ensuring sufficient presence of a human in the algorithmic loop to stay within
the CDS exclusion of the Cures Act. Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at
25–26.
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to health care providers, sometimes quite broadly.21 Epic, the
market leader for EHR systems, has developed several AI-based
tools that are integrated into its EHR suites, including some
addressing COVID-19 risk and deterioration probability for
patients more generally.22 It is also developing a marketplace for
developers to interact with its EHR systems.23 Other EHR
vendors, such as Cerner, have also developed AI products, though
Epic appears to have taken an early lead.24 Although these
products are already distributed widely, it appears that no EHRvendor-developed AI systems have gone through FDA premarket
review.25 And they have quality issues, too; a wide-ranging review
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21 See Sehj Kashyap, Keith E. Morse, Birju Patel & Nigam H. Shah, A Survey
of Extant Organizational and Computational Setups for Deploying Predictive
Models in Health Systems, 28 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 2445 (2021).
22 Epic integrated EHR systems into its COVID-19 prediction models––
models that are used to determine an individual’s likelihood of testing positive
for COVID-19 as well as their likelihood of needing critical care after testing
positive (e.g., the Deterioration Index). Alicia Reale-Cooney, COVID-19 Risk
Model Developed by Cleveland Clinic Now Available to Health Systems Around
the World Through Epic, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Nov. 29, 2020),
https://newsroom.clevelandclinic.org/2020/11/09/covid-19-risk-model-developedby-cleveland-clinic-now-available-to-health-systems-around-the-world-throughepic/; Epic AI Helps Clinicians Predict When COVID-19 Patients Might Need
Intensive Care, EPIC (May 18, 2020), https://www.epic.com/epic/post/epic-aihelps-clinicians-predict-covid-19-patients-might-need-intensive-care. Prior to
the pandemic, Epic produced SlicerDicer, an AI-based tool that “allows a
provider to tap into patient data to investigate clinical conjectures or make new
discoveries about patient populations.” Christina DuVernay, SlicerDicer Reveals
Practice-Based Data, JoHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/office-of-johns-hopkins-physicians/bestpractice-news/slicerdicer-reveals-practice-based-data. Epic is also currently
developing an EHR document assistant that would enable AI to transcribe
patient-clinical interactions. Christopher Jason, Epic in Process of Developing
AI EHR Documentation Assistant, EHR INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 21, 2021),
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/epic-in-process-of-developing-ai-ehrdocumentation-assistant.
23 Epic, Epic App Orchard, https://apporchard.epic.com (last visited Feb. 20,
2022).
24 Christopher Jason, Epic Systems, Cerner Lead EHR Vendors in AI
Development,
EHR
INTELLIGENCE
(May
12,
2020),
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/epic-systems-cerner-lead-ehr-vendors-in-aidevelopment.
25 In September 2021, the FDA released a list of AI and machine-learning
enabled medical devices that have been reviewed and approved for the U.S.
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found problems in many of Epic’s AI products,26 and another
documented problems with its model reporting guidelines. 27

re

B. What can FDA do?

vie

Overall, then, a substantial fraction of AI products already being
used in care settings do not appear to pass through centralized,
national-level review for safety and efficacy. 28 And this lack of
governance isn’t because the products are great. But limited scope
of FDA review isn’t the only problem of centralized governance.

The second problem is more systematic: Even for those AI products
that do go through FDA review, that review only addresses a
subset of the issues for which governance is necessary.
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A burgeoning literature addresses the limitations of FDA review
for AI products writ large. For instance, the vast majority of AI
products that have received some sort of FDA marketing
authorization have gone through the 510(k) clearance process
rather than a full approval.29
510(k) clearance requires
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market. The list does not include any products by Epic or Cerner. Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Enabled Medical Devices, FDA
(Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-devicesamd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medicaldevices ; see also Jodi K. Scott, Kristin Zielinski Duggan, Lina Kontos, Suzanne
Levy Friedman & Kelliann Payne, FDA Launches List of AI and Machine
Learning-Enabled Medical Devices, HOGAN LOVELLS (Sep. 23, 2021),
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/fda-launcheslist-of-ai-and-machine-learning-enabled-medical-devices.
26 Ross, supra note 4.
27 Jonathan H. Lu et al., Low Adherence to Existing Model Reporting
Guidelines by Commonly Used Clinical Prediction Models, MEDRXIV
2021.07.21.21260282,
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.07.21.21260282v1
(Jul.
21,
2021),
28 FDA review is not the only form of such review; insurers also sometimes
play a quality-review function—but appear not to be playing such a role here.
Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 40.
29 Charlotte Tschider, Medical Device Artificial Intelligence: The New Tort
Frontier e, 46 BYU L. REV. 1551, 1597 (2021). The minority that have not gone
through the 510(k) process have been de novo classified as Class I and II devices
rather than undergoing the full Class III premarket approval process. Medical
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demonstrating substantial equivalence to a product that is already
marketed,30 and FDA has made clear that an AI product can be
demonstrated to have substantial equivalence to an already
approved non-AI product.31 But the “substantial equivalence”
standard has long been criticized for insufficient rigor.32 Such
arguments apply in the context of AI systems as well. 33 Critiques
also note FDA’s potential deficit in terms of AI-expert personnel34
(a deficit FDA is trying to remedy35) and raise the challenges of
regulating products that can and potentially should be updated
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Device De Novo Classification Process, 86 Fed. Reg. 54, 826 (Oct. 5, 2021) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 860); see also The De Novo Pathway: What Has Changed
in
10
Years?,
GUIDED
SOLUTIONS
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://www.guidedsolutions.co.uk/blog/the-de-novo-pathway/.
30
Premarket
Notification
510(k),
FDA
(March
13,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarketnotification-510k#se.
31 See How FDA Regulates Artificial Intelligence in Medical Products, PEW
TRUSTS
(Aug.
15,
2021)
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2021/08/how-fda-regulates-artificial-intelligence-inmedical-products.
32 Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence Premarket Review: The Right
Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 365 (defending
the substantial equivalence standard but acknowledging that it “is frequently
compared unfavorably to [pre-market] approval as a means of establishing the
safety and effectiveness of new devices, as an affront to the original intent of the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), and as a “regulatory loophole” that
should be scrapped or, if that is not practical, at least limited to the extent
possible.”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized the difference in rigor between approval and clearance, finding that
approval preempts state tort litigation for certain types of defect, while clearance
does not. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); see also Tschider, supra
note 27, at 1597.
33 Soleil Sha & Abdul El-Sayed, The FDA Should Better Regulate Medical
Algorithms,
SCI.
AM.
(Oct.
7,
2021)
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-fda-should-better-regulatemedical-algorithms/ .
34 Tschider, supra note 27, at 1586 (“To what degree FDA personnel or panel
members actually provide expert direction in this [pre-market approval] review
process is unknown, though facially it seems unlikely that personnel and panel
members are equipped to review software design and anticipate real patient
risks for new software technology like AI from a position of deep expertise.”).
35 Dave Muoio, Commissioner Hahn: FDA Hiring More Data Experts to Help
Healthcare 'Unleash the Power of Data', MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/news/commissioner-hahn-fda-hiring-moredata-experts-help-healthcare-unleash-power-data.
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relatively frequently as new data and performance metrics become
available.36 Some note the challenge of regulating systems
incorporating AI as whole systems, rather than trying to focus on
the algorithm itself.37 And finally, the set of entities with the
resources and capabilities of taking an AI system through the FDA
evaluation process is itself limited—especially given uncertainty
about payment and reimbursement mechanisms38—impacting who
is able to innovate effectively if the default model runs through
FDA.39
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Even setting aside the questions about how to get centralized
governance functioning well in the first place, centralized
governance can only do so much for AI systems that frequently
need to be adapted and responsive to local environments. 40 Some
products might reasonably expect to work the same essentially
irrespective of context; whether a retina shows signs of diabetic
retinopathy when examined through a uniform camera system
hopefully doesn’t change depending on whether that system is used
in an academic medical center in Boston or a clinic in Alabama.41
Other systems that similarly rely on measurements expected to be
universally applicable might fit well into a centralized, national (or
international) regulatory paradigm, whether those systems
calculate heart volumes using machine learning, 42 identify

Id.
See Sara Gerke, Boris Babic, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn Cohen, The
Need for a System View to Regulate Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learningbased Software as Medical Device, NPJ DIGIT. MED., April 7, 2020, at 1.
38 See Price, Sachs & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at __.
39 See Price, supra note 2, at 452–53.
40 See Mark Sendak et al., Machine Learning in Health Care: A Critical
Appraisal of Challenges
and
Opportunities,
7 eGEMS 1,
2,
http://doi.org/10.5334/egems.287 (2019) (“Personalized medicine will require
mass customization of models that are trained and re-calibrated at the hospital
and cohort level. Modern machine learning techniques focus on generalization
beyond a training dataset, not on generalization to different sites.”)
41 See Michael D. Abràmoff, Philip T. Lavin, Michele Birch, Nilay Shah &
James C. Folk, Pivotal Trial of an Autonomous AI-based Diagnostic System for
Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in Primary Care Offices, NPJ DIGIT. MED., Aug.
28, 2018, at 1.
42 See Akhil Narang et. al, Machine Learning Based Automated Dynamic
Quantification of Left Heart Chamber Volumes, 20 EUR. HEART J. 541 (2018)
36
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cerebral hemorrhage on CT scans, 43 or perform other presumably
generalizable tasks. (I say “might” because differences in how data
are recorded and processed or underlying populations could still
limit widespread applicability.44)
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On the other hand, many systems are inherently quite hard to
generalize. Most obviously, systems that predict or recommend
based on site workflow are closely tied to that site—a patient or
staff volume predictor may only be applicable to the venue where
it was developed.45 Predictors of patient deterioration may not
generalize well, whether because of differing patient populations,46
differing care infrastructure and treatment patterns,47 or simply
differing data infrastructures so that different data are recorded
and available for systems to use.48 Predictors of sepsis, for
instance, have been quite difficult to generalize across contexts, as
have predictions of infection by Clostridium difficile.49

See Mohammad R. Arbabshirani et. al, Advanced Machine Learning in
Action: Identification of Intracranial Hemorrhage on Computed Tomography
Scans of the Head with Clinical Workflow Integration, NPJ DIGIT. MED., April. 4,
2018, at 1.
44 The commercially distributed IDx-DR diabetic retinopathy detection
system requires a specific camera system for precisely this reason. Digital
Diagnostics,
IDx-DR,
https://www.digitaldiagnostics.com/products/eyedisease/idx-dr/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
45 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4.
46 W. Nicholson Price II, Contextual Bias and Medical AI, 33 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 66, 91–94 (2019).
47 See id. at 96–97; c.f., M. Scottie Eliassen, Ashleigh King, Christopher
Leggett, Sukdith Punjasthitkul & Jonathan Skinner, The Dartmouth Atlas of
Health Care: 2018 Data Update, DARTMOUTH ATLAS P ROJECT (2021) (providing
the latest update in a series dedicated to reporting the variation in care and
medical services throughout the United States).
48 Price, supra note 41, at 100.
49 Wong et al., supra note 4 (finding that Epic’s sepsis prediction model
correctly identified patients’ risk of sepsis only 63% of the time due to hospitals’
varying definitions of and billing codes for sepsis); Jeeheh Oh et al., A
Generalizable, Data-Driven Approach to Predict Daily Risk of Clostridium
difficile Infection at Two Large Academic Health Centers 39 INFECTION CONTROL
& HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 425, 425 (2018) (finding that institution-specific models
for estimating risk for Clostridium difficile provide “earlier and more accurate
identification of high-risk patients and better targeting of infection prevention
strategies” than a one-size-fits-all approach).
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It’s not always straightforward to figure out which generalizability
bucket a particular product will fit into. Looking at skin lesions to
identify potential skin cancer seems like it might be
generalizable—except that it turns out patient skin color makes a
big difference, and dermatological image databases from different
places are, you guessed it, very different in patient demographics
as well.50 Questions of generalization arise not only across highresource contexts in the U.S. but especially in contexts with
different levels of resources (and presumably different care
patterns),51 and of course are likely to be even more prominent in
international contexts,52 though international implications are
largely beyond the scope of this piece.
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All of this is not to say that AI systems developed specifically for a
particular context can’t usefully be applied to other contexts—just
that that application can take substantial work and is often not
straightforward; more importantly for present purposes,
centralized, national-level governance is a poor fit for localized
application.
III. DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE

tn
ot

Distributed, localized governance will be an essential complement
to national regulators in providing robust oversight for medical AI.
That recognition in itself is important; the normal approach to
validating biomedical credence goods simply won’t cover the gamut
Veronica Rotemberg et al., A Patient-Centric Dataset of Images and
Metadata for Identifying Melanomas Using Clinical Context, 8 SCI. DATA 34, 41
(2021); see also Nicole Westman, Data Used to Build Algorithms Detecting Skin
Disease
is
Too
White,
VERGE
(Sept.
23,
2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/9/22770852/data-dermatology-algorithmsskin-tone-ethnicity. But see Angela Lashbrook, AI-Driven Dermatology Could
Leave Dark-Skinned Patients Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug, 16, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/08/machine-learningdermatology-skin-color/567619/ (citing Haenssle et al.’s study and arguing that,
despite its clear racial disparities, machine-learning software could aid
marginalized communities that don’t have access to a dermatologist and can be
improved over time).
51 Price, supra note 41, at 95–97.
52 See Daniel E. Weissglass, Contextual Bias, The Democratization of
Healthcare, and Medical Artificial Intelligence in Low–and Middle–Income
Countries, BIOETHICS, Aug. 2021, at 1.

Pr

ep

rin

50

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
11
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4051834

12

DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE IN MEDICAL AI
Forthcoming 22 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

we
d

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 221 [2022]

of useful medical AI, at least any time in the near future. 53 With
the need for local governance taken as given for the near term,
then, what could such local governance look like?

vie

A. Examples of local governance

re

One starting point for the normative is the positive; here, some
well-resourced health environments are already engaged in
organized local governance efforts to validate AI before, during,
and after deployment. I focus here on academic medical centers
which have the capacity both for in-house development and
outsourcing models, with the recognition that governance
capabilities and procedures may differ substantially in different
contexts.
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Duke, for instance, has devoted substantial resources to developing
and deploying AI in medical practice.54 It uses a stage-gate
process, where a new AI model needs to move through various
procedural steps before implementation. Outcome measures are
defined with the input of clinical leaders (that is, what is the
algorithm supposed to do in practice), and then performance and
improvement targets are set relative to the baseline of standard
practice. An algorithm is validated on retrospective data, then on
current data while development continues. Once the algorithm is
trained, if adequate performance metrics are met, it is integrated
into Duke’s electronic health records system—but in the
background, and with a smaller set of beta testers, who may see
Could we imagine AI engines so powerful, stable, and flexible, that they
can be validated at a national level, then deployed locally to integrate into
various data ecosystems, collecting and refining data and self-validating
through reports to centralized regulators like FDA? Of course! But that healthalgorithmic utopia is a long way off.
It's also worth noting that localized governance is the norm for much of the
rest of medical practice, such as physician oversight or hospital safety.
Biomedical technologies have typically been treated differently, as described
above.
54 All details in this paragraph are taken from a video interview with Mark
Sendak, Population Health & Data Science Lead, Duke Institute for Health
Innovation, November 3, 2021; see also Duke AI Health, Algorithm-Based
Clinical
Decision
Support
(ABCDS)
Oversight,
https://aihealth.duke.edu/algorithm-based-clinical-decision-support-abcds/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2022).
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delayed results rather than real-time data and who do not use the
algorithm to alter patient care. This period is used to both evaluate
performance and determine what effective integration into the real
clinical workflow would require. If a model passes this background
beta testing, it is evaluated in a prospective study, and only after
passing that can be considered for integration into routine care. At
each stage, the process involves IT, individuals trained in technical
evaluation and data analysis (such as the Duke Institute for
Health Innovation55), and a set of clinical stakeholders across
clinical departments: end users who will need to buy into the new
technology, clinical leadership (including both nursing and
physician staff), and operational leadership.
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The University of Michigan has a similar governance process in
substantive terms, but processes initiatives through the Clinical
Informatics Committee.56 The Committee includes academics, care
providers, and other professionals. Its membership includes
informatics representatives from physicians, pathology, nursing,
and research; it also includes several representatives from Health
IT and Learning Health Systems and adds guests and ad hoc
members as needed. The Committee evaluates requests and
suggestions for models to incorporate, and similarly runs them as
background models for at least six months, after which decisions
are made about potential integration into clinical workflow.

rin

New York University’s Langone Medical Center takes a more
siloed approach: it has an in-house team, conceived of as part of the
IT department but including researchers and clinical staff, that
develops and deploys models, including the process of evaluating
model performance and clinical workflow integration.57

Duke Institute for Health Innovation, https://dihi.org (last visited Feb. 25,
2022).
56 All details in this paragraph are taken from a video interview with
Karandeep Singh, Chair, Michigan Medicine Clinical Intelligence Committee,
Oct. 26, 2021.
57 NYU Langone Health Center for Healthcare Innovation and Delivery
Science,
Predictive
Analytics
and
Machine
Learning,
https://med.nyu.edu/centers-programs/healthcare-innovation-deliveryscience/predictive-analytics-unit.
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What do these various models tell us? Most basically, evaluating,
implementing, and governing a model is a challenging, complex
task. It involves substantial time, effort, and expertise across a
significant timeframe and across both technical and clinical
domains. Some entities treat this as a relatively enclosed process,
largely entrusting it to one unit within the organization (e.g.,
NYU); others treat it more as a committee service requirement
developed on top of other responsibilities (e.g., Michigan); and still
others as a process involving both built-for-purpose subunits and
broader clinical involvement (e.g., Duke). This is a complex,
multimodal, demanding process of governance.
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And governance doesn’t stop at implementation. After the process
of deciding to develop or import a model, evaluating it, and then
integrating it, effective local governance also requires ongoing
monitoring of performance and undertaking maintenance and
updating efforts as required. Among other things, data drift within
a particular environment means that an AI system will tend to lose
performance over time, absent regular updating.58
B. Problematic capacity variations

rin

tn
ot

Relying on the variety of sites that can use medical AI to create
their own governance structures is, frankly, a recipe for failure.
Resources vary wildly across contexts. While the sort of wellresourced academic medical center that has the capacity to develop
AI may well have the capacity to evaluate, deploy, and otherwise
govern that AI (with a bit of emphasis on “may,” since those
capacities are distinct), contexts with fewer resources generally are
similarly less likely to have the governance infrastructure for
evaluation and ongoing monitoring.59
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58 Adarsh Subbaswamy & Suchi Saria, From Development to Deployment:
Dataset Shift, Causality, and Shift-Stable Models in Health AI, 21 BIOSTATISTICS
345 (arguing that datasets need to be monitored and maintained overtime to
account for data shifts and their accompanying performance decay).
59 See, e.g., Tiankai Wang, Yangmei Wang & Alexander McLeod. Do Health
Information Technology Investments Impact Hospital Financial Performance
and Productivity? 28 INT’L J. ACCT. SYS. 1 (2018) (finding that health information
technology investments, like electronic health records adoption, lead to positive
financial performance and productivity); AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, RURAL REPORT:
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At a basic level, health entities differ substantially with respect to
the information technology resources necessary for deploying and
evaluating models. Running models silently in the background of
systems for evaluative purposes demands more technical expertise
and intervention than simply turning on a vendor-provided model
and letting it run (though even that task is often fraught). And
accurately collecting performance metrics brings similar
challenges when deciding whether to go forward and integrate a
model into the clinical workflow.
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Perhaps more significantly, the human resources necessary for
model evaluation are also highly disparate between settings.
Michigan, for instance, relies on committee work that typically sits
atop other responsibilities. Settings stretched for personnel simply
may not be able to call on those human resources (and may not
have staff with the relevant technical expertise in any case).
Standalone units, like NYU Langone’s in-house development team,
are similarly out of reach for all but the most well-resourced
medical environments.

tn
ot

Existing, intense, location-specific modes of governance are simply
infeasible for many medical environments—including those that
might benefit most from the ability of medical AI to democratize
expertise, expand capacity, and improve care.
IV. POLICY INTERVENTIONS
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CHALLENGES FACING RURAL COMMUNITIES AND THE ROADMAP TO ENSURE LOCAL
ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY, AFFORDABLE CARE 14 (Feb. 2019) (“Rural hospitals
are committed to improved care through use of HIT in order to meet past and
current regulatory requirements. . . . Rural hospitals must meet the same
regulatory requirements [in this area] as other hospitals, yet often do not need
the additional technology functionality contained in required, expensive system
upgrades; nor do they have the available infrastructure such as adequate
broadband to support them.”); Jordan Rau & Emmarie Huetteman, Some Urban
Hospitals Face Closure or Cutbacks as the Pandemic Adds to Fiscal Woes, NPR
(Sept.
15,
2020)
https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/09/15/912866179/some-urban-hospitals-face-closure-or-cutbacks-asthe-pandemic-adds-to-fiscal-woe.
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A. Offloading

vie

Given the need for local, ongoing governance of medical AI and the
currently unevenly distributed resources to conduct that
governance, how can policymakers help enable that governance in
the future? My aim here is not to solve the problem, but to sketch
two directions for potential solutions: offloading and building
capacity.
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One approach is to provide resources for low-resource institutions
to offload whatever governance tasks can be reasonably offloaded.
At a federal level, FDA review of AI tools could presumably perform
a partial oversight role (for those tools that go through FDA 60)—
demonstrating that a tool works in principle, for some set of
assumptions—and then leaving the last-mile task of localized
validation to the local entity. But FDA is not the only option.
OCHIN, for instance, vets AI products and provides interfaces
between those products and health system IT infrastructures to
more easily adopt the products of trusted partners. 61 Other
organizations, including for-profit entities that help health
systems make procurement decisions, could develop similar
capabilities.62
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See supra Section II.A.
OCHIN collaborates with a range of technology partners with the
following goal: “As leaders in the EHR space, we take great pride in being able
to provide add-on functionality, services and upgrades to our members from our
vast array of technological partnerships. . . . OCHIN coordinates the interface
and build required to use these products so our members don’t have to, and we
are able to make it available for a fraction of market cost.” See Ochin’s Preferred
Technology Partners, OCHIN, https://ochin.org/technology-partners (last visited
Nov. 21, 2021); see also Christopher Jason, eHealth Exchange Taps Electronic
Case Reporting for Interoperability, EHR INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/ehealth-exchange-taps-electronic-casereporting-for-interoperability; Christopher Jason, Epic Systems, OCHIN
Launch COVID-19 Preparedness Screening App, EHR INTELLIGENCE (March 30,
2020)
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/epic-systems-ochin-launch-covid-19preparedness-screening-app; OCHIN, OCHIN Joins NIH Funded AI/ML
Consortium to Advance Health Equity and Researcher Diversity, PR Newswire
(Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ochin-joins-nihfunded-aiml-consortium-to-advance-health-equity-and-researcher-diversity301395495.html.
62
See,
e.g.
Vizient,
Clinical
Cost
Management,
60
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Offloading is unlikely to get us all the way there; policymakers
should also consider investments in the infrastructure necessary
to enable distributed governance, whether that infrastructure is
technical, data-based, or procedural.
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Technical infrastructure refers to the information technology tools
necessary to process data, run AI tools, integrate those tools into
the care workflow, and—crucially—monitor and evaluate the
outputs to measure performance. 63 Technical infrastructure, in
addition to facilitating in-house distributed governance, can also
facilitate the flow of monitoring data out of the low-resource
context, to enable the sort of outsourced monitoring described
above.64
Technical infrastructure also includes developing
programs or technical tools to monitor performance, to integrate AI
systems developed elsewhere into local clinical data ecosystems
and workflow, and to facilitate the training of local care providers
on new tools.65
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https://www.vizientinc.com/our-solutions/clinical-solutions/clinical-costmanagement (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
63
See,
e.g.,
What
is
IT
Infrastructure?,
IBM,
https://www.ibm.com/topics/infrastructure (last visited Nov. 20, 2022); cf. W.
Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure 16 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 65, 67, 77–79 (2017) (“[H]ealth data infrastructure would be
infrastructure for health data—that is, infrastructure on which health data can
be stored and transmitted (such as computer systems, shared data standards,
and the like). But it should also be infrastructure of health data—that is, a
platform of shared data on which to base further efforts to increase the efficiency
or quality of care. In an infrastructure of data, the data themselves are a
resource to enable productive downstream activity that can improve the health
care system.”).
64 Cf. Kai Hu et al., Federated Learning: A Distributed Shared Machine
Learning Method, COMPLEXITY, Aug. 2021, at 1, 1 (analyzing federated learning:
a machine learning (ML) framework where “multiple clients collaborate to solve
traditional distributed ML problems under the coordination of the central server
without sharing their local private data with others.”).
65 For instance, technical infrastructure can facilitate the reporting of
adverse events, itself typically left to widely distributed individuals. See U.S.
FDA, FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) Electronic Submissions,
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Data infrastructure refers to the development of data resources on
a broad, representative level for the development of AI tools. Why
is this necessary for distributed governance, rather than just for
the development of tools? Three reasons. First, representative
datasets allow at least some types of variation to be built into the
development of AI tools, whether developed for a national audience
or in-house with cross-validation on large, infrastructural
datasets.66 Accordingly, local governance should be easier, because
some problems will be weeded out earlier. Second, the variations
in large datasets can help illuminate the quirks and complexities
of application to varied subsets of data—which can correspondingly
flag issues that local governance should take into account. 67 And
third, infrastructural datasets can help establish performance
baselines against which tools can be measured.

pe

Procedural infrastructure refers to development of processes for
governance so that each entity doing tasks need not reinvent the
wheel but can instead rely on best practices and guides prepared
by experts.68 Many standards have been developed for determining
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https://www.fda.gov/drugs/questions-and-answers-fdas-adverse-eventreporting-system-faers/fda-adverse-event-reporting-system-faers-electronicsubmissions (last visited Feb. 20, 2022) (describing distributed reporting of
adverse events).
66 See, e.g., Core Values, NAT’L INST. HEALTH ALL OF US RSCH. PROGRAM,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/core-values (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) (“The All of
Us Research Program is guided by a set of core values: . . . Participants reflect
the rich diversity of the United States. To develop individualized plans for
disease prevention and treatment, researchers need more data about the
differences that make each of us unique. Having a diverse group of participants
can lead to important breakthroughs. These discoveries may help make health
care better for everyone.”); AIM-AHEAD, Data and Research Core, https://aimahead.net/home/leadership/research (last visited Feb. 20, 2022) (describing the
goal of “linking and preparing multiple sources and types of research data to
form an inclusive basis for AI / ML”).
67 Jeffrey Brown et al., Data Quality Assessment for Comparative
Effectiveness Research in Distributed Data Networks, 51 MED. CARE S22, S28
(2013).
68
See,
e.g.,
Responsible
AI
Practices,
GOOGLE,
https://ai.google/responsibilities/responsible-ai-practices/(last visited Nov. 20,
2021); Good Machine Learning Practice for Medical Device Development:
Guiding Principles, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-
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how best to conduct AI studies and report results,69 including
performance metrics;70 similar tools can ease the process of
governance once tools are developed and reported. What steps
need to be taken to evaluate an AI tool for deployment—and if only
a subset is feasible, what steps are most crucial? Correspondingly,
what steps are so essential that insufficient capacity to perform
them means that model deployment is too risky to go forward?
(This question is a tricky one! It’s easy to answer with the
assumption that everything is necessary, an assumption which is
only realistic from the comfortable seat of a high-resource setting.
Knowing which corners can be reasonably cut is a key question for
democratizing expertise in low-resource settings, in AI
implementation just as much as in care.71) Accordingly, processbased infrastructure tools should include some way to evaluate the
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medical-device-samd/good-machine-learning-practice-medical-devicedevelopment-guiding-principles (last visited Nov. 20, 2021); Reid Blackman, A
Practical Guide to Building Ethical AI, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/10/a-practical-guide-to-building-ethical-ai.
69 See, e.g., Gary S. Collins, Johannes B. Reitsma, Douglas G. Altman &
Karel G.M. Moons, Transparent Reporting of a Multivariable Prediction Model
for Individual Prognosis or Diagnosis (TRIPOD): The TRIPOD Statement, 162
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 55 (2015) (describing the development of the TRIPOD
Statement, “a set of recommendations for the reporting of studies developing,
validating, or updating a prediction model, whether for diagnostic or prognostic
purposes”); Robert F. Wolff et al., PROBAST: A Tool to Assess the Risk of Bias
and Applicability of Prediction Model Studies, 170 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 51,
(describing PROBAST, “a tool for assessing the risk of bias and applicability of
diagnostic and prognostic prediction model studies”); Gary S. Collins et al.,
Protocol for Development of a Reporting Guideline (TRIPOD-AI) and Risk of Bias
Tool (PROBAST-AI) for Diagnostic and Prognostic Prediction Model Studies
Based on Artificial Intelligence, BMJ OPEN, July 2021, at 1 (explaining how
PROBAST and the TRIPOD statement will be extended to prediction models
that utilize machine learning techniques).
70 See, e.g., Mark P. Sendak et al., Presenting Machine Learning Model
Information to Clinical End Users with Model Facts Labels, 3 NPJ DIGIT. MED.
1 (2020).
71 Cf. Price, supra note 41, at 113–14 (“The most straightforward way for AI
algorithms to address cost issues would be to add those issues to the AI’s
optimization function: that is, when scoring outcomes as desirable or
undesirable (for the purposes of care recommendations, at least), the cost of care
could be included in the score, rather than just patient health measures.
Algorithms would then prioritize not simply outcomes or duplicating the
patterns prevalent in High-Resource Hospitals, but also cost-effectiveness.”).
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costs, not only of deploying an AI system, but of effectively
governing that system going forward.

CONCLUSION
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vie

Both infrastructure development and offloading have the potential
for significant scaling, whether in a domestic or an international
context. For instance, tools to monitor performance, processes for
implementing governance structures, and dataset-driven
knowledge about places to seek performance glitches should all be
at least potentially deployable broadly—ideally to environments
globally (with the obvious need for tweaks). Other interventions,
like simply purchasing computer systems or deploying roving
integration-and-evaluation teams, will be less easy to scale.
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None of these interventions will be a magic bullet. Low-resource
environments will still have few resources, barring massive
structural change across the health system (domestic or
worldwide). The people charged with adopting new technology, AI
or otherwise, will still be overworked, under-resourced, and
generally charged with doing too much with too little. Adding the
initial and ongoing governance of AI tools onto overfull plates
seems unfair. Nevertheless, there is hope! To the extent that AI
has the possibility of making that task easier in other domains—of
allowing more to be done with less for patient care, or resource
management, or whatever else—it should be distinctly worth it in
the end. Making the responsible adoption and governance of AI
tools as easy and straightforward as possible looks likely to pay
considerable dividends down the road and should be a focus of
policymakers going forward.
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